This paper studies the properties of self-financing ratios --the share of domestic capital that was financed by domestic savings, without relying on external borrowing. On average, 90% of the stock of capital in developing countries is self financed, and this fraction was stable throughout the 1990s. Greater integration of financial markets throughout the 1990s has not changed the dispersion of self-financing rates. Countries with higher self-financing ratios grew significantly faster than countries with low selffinancing ratios. Financial integration may have facilitated diversification of assets and liabilities, but failed to offer new net sources of financing capital in developing countries.
1.
Introduction and summary
While capital account liberalization for developing countries may have been enthusiastically embraced at the beginning of the 1990s, it is safe to say that by the end of the decade, it had become the single most controversial policy prescription. Following the crises in East Asia and Russia, the debate shifted from when to liberalize the capital account to whether to liberalize it at all (e.g., Rodrik, 1998) . John Williamson, the originator of the much-maligned term, "Washington Consensus", noted explicitly: "I specifically did not include comprehensive capital account liberalization, because that did not command a consensus in Washington." (Williamson 2002) . These developments bear a sharp contrast to the early 1990s, when waves of market-oriented liberalization and greater financial liberalization fueled optimism about the growth prospects of developing countries. Economists expected growing financial integration to augment the capital stock in developing countries by making foreign saving available. This paper proposes a new and simple method for measuring the degree to which this expectation was fulfilled. The measure developed also provides useful information about the degree to which the domestic stock of capital is self-financed.
The seminal paper of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) focused on saving/investment correlations as a measure of capital mobility. It concluded that financial markets had a long way to go towards meaningful integration, even among advanced industrial countries. Their work sparked voluminous research, updating their study, and investigating the usefulness of S/I correlations in assessing the degree of integration of financial markets. Using saving/investment correlations, some concluded that financial markets have become more integrated in recent decades. Others concluded that such correlations do not provide enough information to ascertain the true degree of integration of financial markets [see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1999; Coakleya, Kulasib and Smithc, 1998 for useful overviews of the literature]. While the question addressed in this paper is akin to the one in Feldstein and Horioka (1980) , we use a different methodology, focusing on the ratio of cumulative discounted gross national saving and gross national investment. This ratio provides us with a measure of self-financing -the share of domestic capital that was financed by national saving, without relying on external borrowing. We use this ratio to investigate the 1990s. Arguably, the self-financing ratio captures the inter-temporal aspect of savings and investment better than measures based upon the correlation between saving and investment, and has a more transparent interpretation. The main results are:
We have not found evidence of a significant change in the pattern of financing ratios of developing countries in recent years. This is consistent with the notion that financial integration has facilitated greater diversification of assets and liabilities [see Dooley, 1988; Mody and Murshid, 2002 for analysis of this trend]. 1 Frequently, greater financial integration has resulted in inflows of foreign saving financing outflows of domestic saving, with little net impact on financing ratios. One should note, however, that our paper is focusing on aggregate savings.
The relative stability of the self-financing ratios documented in this paper is consistent with significant changes in the composition of the various forms of capital flows, as has been reported and analyzed by Bosworth and Collins (1999) .
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The average self-financing ratio for developing countries is about 90% (i.e, on average, 90% of the stock of capital in developing countries is self-financed). This ratio remained stable throughout the 1990s notwithstanding the wave of financial liberalization-although there is significant heterogeneity, reviewed later in this paper. Interestingly, the greater integration of financial markets has not changed the dispersion of self-financing ratios. The standard deviation of the cross-country distribution of self-financing ratios in the 1990s is about 0.18.
There is no evidence of a "growth bonus" associated with increasing the financing share of foreign saving. The evidence suggests just the opposite: throughout the 1990s, countries with higher self-financing ratios grew significantly faster than countries with low self-financing ratios 3 . This reinforces the skeptical assessment of the growth effects of financial liberalizations (see Rodrik, 1998; Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2004; and Aizenman, 2004 for a review of the debates about financial opening). Yet, our results do not rule out the possibility that financial liberalization may impact the "quality of growth," as measured by TFP.
Higher volatility of self-financing ratios, measured by the standard deviation of the ratio, is associated with lower growth rates. Better institutions are associated with a higher growth rate.
Interestingly, in a growth regression, the quality of institutions variable "soaks" the explanatory power from the volatility of self-financing ratios, rendering it insignificant, but leaving intact the positive convex effect of self-financing ratios on real per capita GDP growth. Notably, the correlation between the change in de-facto financial openness between 1980s and 1990s and the change in the self-financing ratio between 1991 (result of capital accumulation in decade of 1980s) and 2001 (capital accumulation during the 1990s) is, for all practical purposes, zero.
Also, while the financial opening was substantial -the average and median increases in financial openness were 65%, and 30% respectively -changes in the self-financing ratios were insignificant in comparison.
Disaggregating across regions reveals considerable heterogeneity. First, only in Latin America does there seem to be a weak trend towards greater dispersion of the financing ratios, with a marginal decline of the mean from about 0.9 to 0.87. The opposite is observed in Asia:
the self-financing ratio increased from 1.01 to 1.06, and the dispersion declined. Most of the increase is observed in the aftermath of the 1997-8 crisis. These observations are consistent with the notion that, as a region, Asia has financed its rapid accumulation of capital domestically, and the 1997-8 crisis has led to a significant surge in precautionary saving. In contrast, Latin
America and Africa have increased their reliance on foreign savings as means of financing their tangible capital, by about 3 percentage points. As the counterpart to self-financing dynamics in developing countries, we observe an increase in the mean and standard deviation of selffinancing ratios among OECD countries.
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Our analysis does not permit an inference about direct causality -we cannot infer that policies aimed at increasing self-financing ratios would be growth and welfare improving. All that we can infer is that despite greater financial integration, foreign savings on average have not provided a viable source of financing domestic capital for developing countries. The main benefit would seem to be greater financial asset diversification. Even on this account, the welfare effects are not clear-cut. Some studies suggest we have a long way to go before exhausting the bulk of the diversification gains [see Tesar (1999) ]. Other studies suggest that the welfare effect of diversification is mixed in the presence of political polarization, where capital movements are motivated by the attempts to reduce the tax base available to future administrations [see Alesina and Tabellini (1989) ].
Methodology
We use the national income accounts to construct a self-financing ratio, indicating the stock of tangible capital supported by past national saving, relative to the actual stock of capital.
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Let gross investment and national saving at time t, in constant PPP, be t t S I ; , respectively. Let k denote the fixed initial capital/GDP ratio, d the depreciation rate, and Y real GDP in constant prices. We denote the 'ideal' self-financing ratio by fˆ. This ideal measure would be obtained by unbounded backward discounting, if we had all past information:
If t fˆ were measured in ideal circumstances, a value of 1 would correspond to an economy where the entire stock of domestic capital is self-financed. A self-financing ratio below one indicates reliance on foreign saving --1-t fˆ is the foreign-financing ratio, measuring the fraction of domestic capital that was financed by foreign saving. In practice, it is difficult to "backcast" S and I an infinite number of years. This limitation induces us to rely on approximated measures of self-financing. The approximated self-financing ratio at time t, calculated using a "backcast" horizon of n periods, is defined by:
In the Appendix we characterize the difference between the self-finance measure n t f ; , and the 'ideal' self-finance measure, t fˆ. For an economy growing at a constant rate g we find that
Consequently, for large n and d, the gap between (2) and the ideal self-financing measure, (1), is inconsequential.
If n and d are large enough, then the approximated self-financing ratio, n t f ; , would be insensitive to the initial estimated stock of capital; and changing of the discounting horizon n would lead to negligible changes of the estimated values. In Appendix A we also show that , (4) where t g is the growth rate of the estimated stock of capital at time t, defined by To allow meaningful panel comparison across countries and across time we proceed by calculating the financing ratios of developing countries, varying t but holding n constant. Next, we evaluate the systematic changes of the distribution of the self-financing ratios in recent years. 7 The choices of n and d are dictated by data availability and the desire to have a large enough sample of developing countries. In the base specification, we set k = 3, n = 10 and d = 0.1, ending with a panel of self-finance ratios covering the 1990s for 47 countries. 8 As we do not have any obvious benchmark year to anchor the calculations of the self-financing ratios for all countries, we impose a fixed discounting horizon n for all countries. In Appendix A we show that an exact version of (4) 6 A natural benchmark is financial autarky ( f = 1), where the entire domestic stock of capital is self financed. A balanced current account (S = I) would preserve the financial autarky position of the economy. In contrast, a country that over-finances its stock of capital (f > 1, like the position of Japan in the eighties), would find that maintaining a stable self-financing ratio over time requires running a current account surplus proportional to the over-financing rate (f -1) times the sum of the growth rate and the depreciation rate. For such a country, a balanced current account position would reduce the self financing ratio overtime, towards f = 1.
It is useful to note that the self-financing ratio defined in (2) provides information that differs from the calculations of external wealth of nations [see Kraay et. al., 2000] and external wealth of nations [see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001 ]. These papers evaluate the net assets and characterize the portfolios of a country, hence rely on current market prices of assets and liabilities. In contrast, the self-financing ratio identifies the degree to which the stock of capital has been self-financed, aggregating past national saving and investment. While valuation changes (due to real exchange rate shocks, stock market changes, partial defaults, etc.) would have first-order effects on the wealth and net worth of nations, these would have only secondorder impacts on the self-financing ratios.
Before turning to the main results, we would like to acknowledge the obvious limitations of our methodology. First, the quality of the self-financing ratios evaluated in this study is limited by the quality and availability of the data, and the accuracy of the assumptions about the various parameters [k, d, etc.] . Second, the skepticism in the literature about the interpretation of the Feldstein and Horioka correlations applies to this paper as well, as we do not attempt to model the forces leading to the observed financing ratios. With these caveats, we argue that sharp changes in self-financing ratios, or the absence of such changes, provide useful diagnostic information about structural changes associated with the integration of capital markets.
Self-financing ratios of developing countries in the 1990s
The analysis begins by evaluating the patterns of self-financing ratios throughout the 1990s. For data limitation reasons, we choose n = 10 [recall that n is the window of calculating the financing share, see (2) We now examine the association between real per capita GDP growth and the level and volatility of self-financing ratios in the 1990s. Table 1 summarizes the cross-country regressions of the average real per capita GDP growth rate in the 1990s on the average self-financing ratio, on the square and the cube of the financing gap, f -1, and on the volatility of the self-financing ratio. Column 1 presents results without controlling for quality of institutions and measures of trade and financial openness. On balance, higher self-financing ratios (implying higher self financing of a given investment) are associated with a significant increase in growth rates. This effect is convex, as shown in Figure 2 , which plots the relationship between the self-financing ratio and per capita GDP growth rates for the case of a stable self-financing ratio. A rise in the self-financing ratio from 1 to 1.1 is associated with an increase in the growth rate from 2.8% to 4.4%. Further, reducing the self-financing ratio from 1 to 0.9 is associated with a drop in the growth rate from 2.8% to 2.2%. Regarding volatility, column 1 indicates that increasing the s.d.
of the self-financing ratio from zero to 0.05 would reduce the growth rate associated with a given average self-financing rate by almost 1 %! The results are not driven by any obvious regional patterns: Adding regional dummies [Asia, Africa and Latin America] to the regression reported in Table 1 leads to results that are exactly in line with our expectations. Africa is growing significantly slower, while all key variables retain previous sign and significance. We also attempted to control for other variables that are used frequently in growth regressions [like the initial GDP per capita, etc.], but these controls were insignificant. We verified the robustness of these results, adding controls that have been used in the growth literature like the initial GDP per capita, the initial investment/GDP ratio, and the initial self-financing ratio. Among the added variables, only initial investment ratio is significant with expected sign, not affecting our conclusion about a positive association between growth and self-financing.
[Insert Table 1 Table 2 shows that better institutions are associated with less volatile self-financing ratios, which suggest that the adverse effects of higher volatility of self-financing ratios on growth may stem from institutional weaknesses. 12 This conjecture is confirmed in column 2 of Table 1 , which repeats the regression reported in column 1 while controlling for the quality of institutions. Better institutions are associated with a higher growth rate. Interestingly, the quality of institutions variable "soaks" the explanatory power from the volatility of self-financing ratios, rendering it insignificant, but leaving intact the positive convex effect of self-financing ratios on real per capita GDP growth. Results from Cross-country differences in levels and changes of self-financing ratios cannot be explained by variables such as quality of institutions, trade and financial openness, and regional differences 14 , 15 . Notably the correlation between the change in de-facto financial openness between 1980s and 1990s and the change in the self-financing ratio between 1991 (result of accumulation in decade of 1980s) and 2001 (accumulation in 1990s) is, for all practical purposes, zero ( Figure 3) . Also, while the financial opening was substantial -the average and median increases in financial openness were 65%, and 30%, respectively -changes in the self-financing rates were insignificant 16 . Finally, it is noteworthy that we study the 1990s only due to data limitations -consistent data on savings and investments in developing countries are available for very few developing countries before 1980 and we need at least 10 years of capital and saving accumulation to get the initial self-financing figure. [Insert Figure 3 about here]
4. Self-financing ratios -regional and selected countries' experience Throughout the nineties, Asia exhibits high self-financing ratios and high growth rates (with the exception of 1998). In contrast, Latin America and Africa display low self-financing ratios, and relatively low growth rates. Interestingly, the drop in the self-financing ratios in Africa through much of the 1990s was not associated with a sustained growth bonus -the growth rate picked up in the early 1990s, collapsing in the second half. The growth performance of Latin America was more evenly distributed throughout the nineties, exhibiting no obvious growth bonus of the drop in the self-financing ratios. Unlike the experience of Africa, the growth drop of Asia in the aftermath of the 1997-8 crises had been associated with a remarkable increase of the selffinancing ratios, pushing it well above one, and with the resumption of robust growth.
[Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here]
We now briefly review the patterns of self-financing ratios and growth of selected countries. Figures 6.A and 6.C pertain to the two most populous countries, China and India.
Both experience rapid self-financed growth --their self-financing 1990s ratios are greater than one. The main difference is that the self-financing ratio exhibits rapid downward trend in China, and very mild upward trend in India. There results are in line with the cross country regression reported in Table 1 , which details the positive association between self-financing ratios and growth. To complete this picture, figure 6 .B focuses on Brazil, a country that experienced an even more rapid decline in the self-financing ratio than China while starting from a lower initial level. Characteristically, the country failed to benefit from any associated "growth bonus". This is a pattern common to the "average" Latin American country [see Figures 3 and 4 ]. Another typical case is Bolivia depicted in Figure 6 .D, a country that is characterized by exceptionally low levels of self-financing, but also mediocre growth performance.
[Insert Figure 6 about here] While countries characterized by higher self-financing ratios in the 1990s experienced, on average, higher growth rates, there are several examples of countries that experienced large increases in self-financing ratios with no detectable growth bonus. Figure 6 .E and 6.F reports the experience of Ecuador and Pakistan --the self-financing ratios of both countries increased substantially in the 1990s, at a time when their growth rates were flat (Ecuador) or falling substantially (Pakistan). Thus, there is no guarantee that a rising self-financing ratio will produce faster growth 17 . Economic growth depends on all the factors that explain the magnitude and the quality of investment in all types of capital. For most developing countries, the obstacles preventing higher growth are not the degree of financial integration, but other more basic structural obstacles. While the financial liberalization of the mid-1990s is associated with a sizable drop in the self financing ratio, the sudden stop and remarkable adjustment which followed have led to a sharp reversal in the self-financing ratio. Yet, the self-financing rate in 2001 (marginally above 1), was well below the self-financing rate observed in 1991 (about 1.035). Figures 7.C and 7.D report the growth and self-financing ratios of Malaysia and the Philippines, respectively. The patterns of both countries resemble that of Korea, however the increase in the self-financing ratios in the aftermath of the 1997-8 crisis was much sharper. This can be explained by the fact that pre-crisis self-financing ratios in these countries were substantially lower and falling below 0.9 shortly before the episode while in the aftermath of crisis, countries returned to full self-financing. This is consistent with the observation that the East Asian crisis led the affected countries to follow a similar pattern --a sizeable increase in precautionary savings, quite independently of their dejure integration with the global financial system. Indeed, this pattern is exhibited by the regional means and standard deviations of the self-financing ratio in Figure 1 .C. Figure 7 .E deals with the dramatic experience of Argentina. The financial opening of the 1990s is associated with a sizable drop in the self-financing ratio, from about 0.92 to 0.88. This drop ends with the sudden stop, which led to a partial reversal of the earlier decline. As in the previous cases, the ability to finance a growing share of the domestic capital by foreign saving is not associated with any "growth bonus." In fact, the period of relatively rapid growth in the early 1990s is associated with a higher self-financing ratio. Mexico, depicted in Figure 7 .F, exhibits a crisis-triggered reversal in its declining self-financing ratio, with economic growth that is on average stronger during the time the self-financing ratio increased. These results suggest that political economy factors and political risk diversification are important in understanding the association between the self-financing ratios and growth.
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[Insert Figure 7 about here]
Concluding remarks: robustness, extensions, and interpretations
Our study proposes a new method for evaluating the net sources for financing the domestic stock of capital. We illustrated the usefulness of this method by evaluating the actual patterns of financing the capital stock of developing countries in the 1990s. Combining this method with measures of de-facto financial integration enables one to trace the association between gross and net capital flows. Among our results, we find that throughout the 1990s, a period characterized by a rapid increase in gross capital flows, developing countries exhibit overall stable self-financing ratios. As is frequently the case, the quality of the results is limited by the quality of the data, and the auxiliary assumptions. For some countries, the calculated selffinancing ratio may underestimate the actual. 19 Tracing these biases is left for future investigation. We close the section with a discussion of extensions.
Our analysis used self-financing ratios constructed on the basis of national saving data.
An alternative strategy is to construct self-financing ratios using gross domestic saving instead of national saving [recall that the gap between the two is "net current transfers from abroad"]. It turned out that this modification does not impact the aggregate pattern reported in Figure 1a : the financial liberalizations of the early nineties led to very small changes in self-financing ratios in the late nineties, and was associated with an overall drop in the standard deviation of the crosscountry distribution of self-financing ratios. The domestic saving data indicates that, while the situation in other regions is stable, Latin America's dependence on domestic saving is rapidly decreasing, while OECD countries increase exports of domestic savings faster than is the case with national savings. Another change deals with Figure 3 : while the correlation between financial opening and changes in national saving is negative and non-significant, the correlation between financial opening and changes in domestic saving is negative and significant at 10%.
We extended our study, applying our mythology to a panel/cross-sectional time-series, during We close the paper by noting that, by design, our statistical analysis does not allow us to make any inference about causality between self-financing ratios and growth, and about the relative importance of changes in saving versus investment in explaining the performance of countries. There are several possible channels that may explain our results. For example, a takeoff triggered by relaxing the state's restrictions on private investment and private saving would increase both S and I over time, with little impact on the need to borrow externally, as apparently has been the case in China and India.
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Indeed, the experience of developing countries suggests that increasing saving rates would not occur overnight, and it may be a time consuming process.
In an important study Carroll and Weil (1994) illustrated that the saving rates of East Asian countries (like Korea, Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong) were much lower several decades ago, and their thriftiness is a more recent phenomenon. They pointed out that the "statistical" causality may run from a higher growth rate to a higher saving rate; and conjectured that the growthsaving causality may be explained in a model where utility depends both on present and past consumption, i.e. habit formation [see also Carroll et. al. (2000)].
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This result has been confirmed in the World Bank (1993) study of the remarkable take offs in East Asia, confirming the presence of statistical causality from higher growth to higher saving. A possible interpretation is that the advent of trade liberalization expands opportunities for the import of capital goods and foreign technology. Imports of foreign technology and domestic reforms encouraging entrepreneurships raise total factor productivity and GDP growth. If consumption adjustment is sluggish, due to habit persistence, then higher growth raises incomes, but does not raise consumption. Clearly in this story, causality runs from higher technology growth (imports and better utilization of existing resources) to higher saving.
"Habit formation," however, may be observationally equivalent to adaptive learning in the presence of uncertainty -in countries where private savings were taxed in an arbitrary and unpredictable way, the credibility of a new regime could not be assumed or imposed. Instead, credibility must be acquired as an outcome of a time consuming learning process. In these circumstances, a higher growth rate may be viewed as a signal used in this learning process.
23 21 This pattern is consistent with the notion that higher growth increases the saving rate overtime (see Edwards, 1995 , who concludes that the rate of output growth has a significant, positive effect on saving). 22 The habit formation hypothesis states that people get utility from a comparison of their current level of consumption to the level that they are "accustomed to," the latter corresponds to the habitual level of consumption, as defined by consumption history. Habits make consumers reluctant to change consumption drastically following fundamental shocks, slowing the adjustment of consumption. Habit formation implies that the consumer is more willing to postpone consumption in response to an increase in productivity, and thus make the saving response to a surge in productivity stronger. 23 Frequently the effectiveness of a new administration and its commitment to growth oriented policies is unknown.
In these circumstances the private sector will update its prior regarding the competence of the administration and the saving rate according to various signals (like the duration of a reform, inflation, public debt, etc.). As these signals are positively correlated with the realized growth, growth "explains" saving.
Another possibility is that agents in different countries react to different exposure to financial risk differently, under conditions of asymmetric information. The desire to diversify these risks may lead to two-way capital flows, with little change in net positions [see Dooley (1988) ].
Researchers have found that although foreign portfolio capital inflows do not raise growth rates, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows can play an important role in raising growth rates, as apparently has been the case in China. FDI is important not because it augments capital, but because it promotes trade linkages and the transfer of technology. This suggests that the composition of flows matters, as has been illustrated by Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2006) and Ju and Wei (2006) . Note, however, that FDI did not play an important role in earlier take offs in East Asia [Japan, Korea, Taiwan, etc.] . Our paper suggests that financial integration is neither sufficient nor necessary condition for successful takeoffs, and deeper understanding of takeoffs remains a challenge. 24 All these issues are left for future investigation. 
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(A1) where 1 ; 1
is the growth rate of the stock of capital at time t, and we assumed that . For large enough d and n, the difference is of second-order magnitude. An advantage of the fixed discounting horizon n is that it should allow better comparison across time, especially for the case of different base years applied to various countries.
The bias associated with fixed discounting horizon:
Our empirical analysis was based on a fixed discounting horizon, n, assuming that the initial stock of capital ( n t K − ) was self-financed. We now assess the magnitude of the bias introduced by this assumption. For simplicity, we focus on the case where real GDP, real saving and real investment grow at a constant rate, g, and each period a constant fraction of the investment is self-financed. Hence,
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